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How to Read a DMARC Report: A Practical Beginner’s Guide

To read a DMARC report, check who produced it and the reporting period, then examine each record’s sending IP address, message count and aligned SPF/DKIM results. Compare failures with your approved sending services before deciding what needs fixing. A failed result is a reason to investigate, not proof of an attack.

This guide focuses on aggregate reports: the XML attachments that help IT teams understand mail using their business domain. The fictional example below turns one report into an investigation plan. It does not cover fixing a “DMARC policy not enabled” warning or provide a universal DNS configuration.

What Is a DMARC Aggregate Report?

DMARC stands for Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance. It connects email authentication with the domain in the visible From address and lets domain owners publish handling preferences and request feedback.

An aggregate report summarises observations from a receiving mail system during a stated period, commonly a day. Reports are requested through the rua address in the domain’s DMARC DNS record. They are not a complete record of everything your company sent: participation and reporting coverage vary. Microsoft explains aggregate report delivery and monitoring.

An aggregate report normally contains grouped technical results rather than email bodies. It cannot tell you whether a particular invoice reached someone’s inbox or whether someone opened it. Per-message failure reports, requested using ruf, are a different report type and can expose more sensitive information.

Open the Attachment Safely

Use a report you expected to receive through your organisation’s reporting process. A familiar-looking subject line alone does not establish that an attachment is safe.

  1. Save the attachment and follow your organisation’s malware-scanning process. Reports may arrive as XML or compressed files such as .gz or .zip.
  2. Extract an expected XML file using an approved tool and open it in a text editor. You do not need to run a program or enable macros.
  3. For ongoing review, use an approved reporting platform that can group records and preserve their detail. Check its data-handling terms before uploading business reports.
  4. If developing a parser, treat both compressed files and XML as untrusted input: limit decompression and disable external entity resolution. Use namespace-aware parsing for newer reports.

Reading an existing file needs no Microsoft 365 administrator licence. Access to the reporting mailbox or platform is required. Changing DNS or a sending service’s authentication settings requires separately authorised access; this guide makes no tenant changes.

Read These Fields First

Work from the report’s context towards the individual results. The reporting organisation is the receiver producing the report, not necessarily your email supplier.

Field Investigation Question Useful Next Check
report_metadata Who reported this, and which report is it? Preserve reporter and report ID to help avoid counting duplicate imports.
date_range/begin and end Which period does this cover? Convert the Unix timestamps to UTC; compare logs for that period.
policy_published/domain and p Which policy domain and policy did the receiver observe? Compare with the change record, rather than assuming today’s DNS was in force.
adkim and aspf Which alignment modes were used? r is relaxed; s is strict. Their defaults are relaxed.
source_ip and count Which connecting server produced this group, and how many messages? Match the source to an approved service and its logs.
identifiers/header_from Which visible From domain was evaluated? Compare this with the authenticated domains.
policy_evaluated/dkim and spf Did either authentication route satisfy DMARC? At least one aligned pass is sufficient.
auth_results Which domains were authenticated, and with what raw results? Identify authentication failure versus successful authentication for an unaligned domain.
disposition and any reason What DMARC handling was reported, and was there an exception? Read the reason alongside the published policy.

One IP address can appear in several records with different identifiers or results. Do not treat one row as one sender or count each row as one message.

Allow for Older and Newer Report Formats

As checked on 15 November 2026, RFC 9990 defines aggregate reporting, alongside the core DMARC specification, RFC 9989. Older RFC 7489-style reports remain relevant when reading existing mail.

New-format XML uses the namespace urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0. Newer disposition values include pass; older reports commonly show none for passing mail. Neither value proves inbox placement. If a viewer reports no records while the XML visibly contains them, check whether it supports the file’s namespace and format before concluding that there was no traffic.

Understand Authentication and Alignment

SPF checks whether the connecting server is permitted for the envelope sender domain, normally the MAIL FROM domain. DKIM checks a cryptographic signature associated with a signing domain, shown as d= in a message’s DKIM signature. Neither raw pass automatically validates your visible From domain.

DMARC needs a successful SPF or DKIM check whose authenticated domain also aligns with the visible From domain. Both mechanisms need not pass. Under relaxed alignment, their organisational domains must match; strict alignment requires an exact domain match. For example, bounce.example.com can align with example.com under relaxed SPF alignment, but mailer.example.net cannot.

policy_evaluated reports the DMARC-related outcomes; auth_results provides the underlying authentication evidence. If both DMARC-related results fail but raw SPF passes, inspect the SPF domain. Adding an IP to your domain’s SPF record will not solve a service authenticating only its own unrelated domain. Microsoft’s alignment examples explain the distinction.

A Fictional DMARC Report, Worked Through

Illustrative training example: example.com is a fictional business domain, the reporter is fictional and 192.0.2.25 is a documentation-only IP address. This is a deliberately simplified legacy-format report, not a TechVertu customer report. It contains one group of 40 messages and uses relaxed alignment with monitoring policy p=none.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feedback>
  <report_metadata>
    <org_name>Fictional Receiving Provider</org_name>
    <email>[email protected]</email>
    <report_id>training-20261101-01</report_id>
    <date_range>
      <begin>1793491200</begin>
      <end>1793577599</end>
    </date_range>
  </report_metadata>
  <policy_published>
    <domain>example.com</domain>
    <adkim>r</adkim>
    <aspf>r</aspf>
    <p>none</p>
  </policy_published>
  <record>
    <row>
      <source_ip>192.0.2.25</source_ip>
      <count>40</count>
      <policy_evaluated>
        <disposition>none</disposition>
        <dkim>fail</dkim>
        <spf>fail</spf>
      </policy_evaluated>
    </row>
    <identifiers>
      <header_from>example.com</header_from>
    </identifiers>
    <auth_results>
      <dkim>
        <domain>mailer.example.net</domain>
        <result>pass</result>
        <selector>news</selector>
      </dkim>
      <spf>
        <domain>bounce.mailer.example.net</domain>
        <scope>mfrom</scope>
        <result>pass</result>
      </spf>
    </auth_results>
  </record>
</feedback>

What the Report Establishes

The period is 1 November 2026, 00:00:00–23:59:59 UTC. Forty messages used example.com in the visible From field. Raw SPF and DKIM passed for domains under example.net, while both DMARC-related checks failed. The authenticated domains do not align with example.com.

The receiver reports none under a monitoring policy. That does not turn either failure into a pass, and it does not establish that the messages reached inboxes.

What Still Needs Evidence

Suppose the marketing manager recognises the service as the company’s newsletter platform. That is a lead, not the end of verification. Ask for the approved account owner, campaign activity during the reporting window and the service’s authenticated-domain configuration. Shared infrastructure and an IP-provider lookup alone cannot establish which customer account sent the mail.

If those checks confirm the legitimate service, an authorised administrator can investigate its supported custom DKIM signing or custom MAIL FROM setup. An aligned DKIM pass would be sufficient even if SPF remained unaligned. Follow that provider’s current instructions, preserve the previous DNS values and test a harmless message before assessing subsequent reports. No particular vendor configuration has been tested here.

If nobody can establish ownership, retain the group as unresolved. Do not add an unknown source to SPF just to make a dashboard green.

Turn Each Pattern Into an Investigation

Use this matrix as a working triage aid. “Known” means supported by an approved service inventory and corroborating evidence, not merely a recognisable hosting company.

Observed Pattern Working Interpretation Evidence and Action
Known service; raw SPF/DKIM pass; both DMARC results fail Likely alignment configuration problem Compare MAIL FROM and signing domains with From; review the service’s custom-domain options.
SPF fails; aligned DKIM passes DMARC can still pass Check forwarding or the sending route if unexpected; do not treat SPF failure alone as DMARC failure.
Known service; both DMARC results fail Legitimate mail may be at risk Obtain a controlled test’s headers and service logs; distinguish broken signatures, SPF problems and misalignment.
Unknown source; both fail Possible spoofing, overlooked service or indirect mail flow Check business owners and forwarding paths; avoid automatic authorisation or an unsupported attack claim.
Both fail; disposition differs from requested policy Receiver exception or other policy handling may apply Read reason; compare the policy effective during that reporting period.
Aligned authentication passes from an unexpected source Authenticated domain use still needs investigation Check authorised accounts, applications and keys; a pass is not a judgement that the content is safe.

Forwarding can break SPF because the connecting server changes. DKIM may survive forwarding, but message modifications can break its signature. Mailing lists and receiver exceptions complicate interpretation. Use headers and logs to investigate the route rather than assuming every forwarded failure is harmless.

For a specific Microsoft 365 message, use authorised message-trace access and a safely obtained copy of the headers. An aggregate row groups messages; it cannot identify an individual invoice by itself.

Keep an Investigation Worksheet

Copy the following fields into your approved ticketing system or spreadsheet for each unresolved group:

Record to Keep Why It Matters
Reporter, report ID and UTC window Establish the evidence and avoid duplicate imports.
From domain, source IP, count and authenticated domains Keep the actual observation separate from a supplier guess.
Raw results, DMARC results, disposition and reason Prevent a raw pass or none from being mistaken for DMARC success.
Business service, named owner and corroborating logs Establish whether the sender is authorised by the business.
Status: verified legitimate, unauthorised or unresolved Preserve uncertainty while investigation continues.
Proposed change, approver and previous configuration Make any remediation accountable and reversible.
Controlled test result and follow-up reporting window Establish whether the intended sending path now authenticates and aligns.

Prioritise failures affecting business-critical legitimate mail, such as billing or password resets, alongside material unexplained changes. A low-volume failure can matter more operationally than thousands of unrelated spoofing attempts.

When calculating a reported pass rate, sum the count values of groups with at least one DMARC-related pass, then divide by the total reported message count. Do not average row percentages or count a group twice because both SPF and DKIM pass. Label the result with its reporters, period and coverage; it is not your whole business’s delivery rate.

Check These Points Before Changing Policy

Review enough reporting periods to include less frequent legitimate senders, such as monthly billing. Compare evidence across receivers and avoid treating one quiet day as proof that every service is ready for enforcement.

  1. Confirm each legitimate service has a responsible owner and an understood authentication path.
  2. Investigate failures with headers, logs and current vendor documentation.
  3. Record DNS or service changes, approval and a rollback route.
  4. Send controlled tests and inspect later reports for the intended improvement.
  5. Have the authorised domain administrator assess any policy change separately.

Do not weaken an existing enforcement policy simply because an unknown sender fails. Equally, do not move straight to rejection to remove an unexplained warning. Report reading supplies evidence for that decision; it does not replace a controlled deployment.

If the concern is a suspicious message someone has already opened, follow our separate spam-email response guide. Aggregate reports are not an incident-response verdict.

Frequently Asked Questions

Make Email Authentication Easier to Investigate

Keep a named owner for every sending service and take unresolved findings to your IT team. Explore TechVertu’s email security services or Microsoft 365 support to discuss your business requirements.

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